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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees that no State “shall deny any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”1 Nevertheless, the 
government still makes inevitable, constitutionally permissible 
classifications and distinctions.2 Courts defer to legislatures when 
 
 1  U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV, § 1.  
 2  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-21 (1982) (identifying the three main 
levels of scrutiny through which equal protection claims are evaluated and 
asserting that the “initial discretion . . . resides in the legislatures” unless the 
classifications disadvantage a “suspect class”).  
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the distinctions are rational.3 But in some cases, courts subject 
these classifications to a heightened level of scrutiny.4 This occurs 
when courts find the discriminated group is a “suspect class.”5 
A suspect class is a group that meets a series of factors that 
suggest the group is historically subject to discrimination or 
political powerlessness and warrants protection.6 One example of a 
suspect classification is race.7 Historically, most laws that use race-
based classifications rely on racial discrimination and have no 
legitimate purpose.8 Classifications like this are automatically 
suspect and receive closer scrutiny.9 Courts often strike down laws, 
regulations, and any government action that discriminates against 
suspect classifications under the Equal Protection Clause.10 Thus, 
an equal protection claim may be determinative on whether a class 
is a “suspect,” “quasi-suspect,” or “non-suspect” group. 
The Court has found that race, national origin, and alienage are 
all suspect classifications.11 However, the Court declined to extend 
 
 3   Id.  
      4   Id.; Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) 
(“[A] government practice or statute . . . which contains ‘suspect classifications’ 
is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and can be justified only if furthers a 
compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive 
alternative is available.”); see, e. g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973). 
 5    Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357.  
 6    See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (finding that a suspect class is one 
“saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such history of purposeful 
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as 
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”). 
 7 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are 
inherently suspect and call for the most exacting judicial examination”); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”). 
8    Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291-99.  
9    Id.; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.  
 10 Id.  
 11 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 61 (discussing race as the prime example of a 
suspect classification and identifying national origin, alienage, indigency and 
illegitimacy as suspect classifications in some settings); see generally Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (discussing national origin and alienage); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing race); Hernandez v. Texas, 
347 U.S. 475, 480-81 (1954) (discussing national origin); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (discussing race). 
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this suspect status to illegal aliens12 in Plyler v. Doe—relying 
substantially on the voluntary nature of the class.13 This reasoning 
falls short when applied to the children of undocumented aliens. 
Unlike undocumented adults, as the Court in Plyler itself stated, an 
undocumented youth-based classification14 “imposes a lifetime 
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their 
disabling status.”15 
The children of undocumented entrants are not comparable to 
undocumented adult entrants.16 This note presents the legal 
argument that minor children of undocumented entrants are distinct 
from undocumented adult entrants, and, as such, should not be 
grouped together under one single “illegal alienage” class. Instead, 
they should be extended “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” classification 
status. Their nonconformity with the general illegal alienage 
characteristics set forth in Plyler and their satisfaction of multiple 
factors used by the Court to determine what constitutes a suspect 
class sets them apart.  
In this note, Part I provides a historical background of the 
Equal Protection Clause and a summary of the evolution of suspect 
classes and suspect classifications. Part I also examines the 
undocumented youth class and distinguishes this group from adult 
 
 12 Illegal aliens, undocumented aliens, undocumented entrants, and 
undocumented immigrants are terms used interchangeably throughout this note. 
These terms refer to “an alien who entered the United States illegally without 
the proper authorization and documents, or who entered the United States 
legally and has since violated the terms of his or her visa or overstayed the time 
limit . . . [and is] deportable if apprehended.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
(IRS), Immigration Terms and Definitions Involving Aliens: Undocumented 
Alien (last reviewed/updated May 5, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/immigration-terms-and-
definitions-involving-aliens (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
 13 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (rejecting that “illegal 
aliens” are a “suspect class,” and highlighting that unlike most of the 
classifications recognized as suspect “entry into this class, by virtue of entry into 
this country, is the product of voluntary action”).  
 14 Undocumented youth is used interchangeably with undocumented 
children, DREAMERs, undocumented students, and minor children of 
undocumented entrants. The terms refer to undocumented children who were 
brought to the United States through no fault of their own. This includes 
children that were brought as minors and may now be adults.  
 15 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.  
 16 Id. at 219 (“The children . . . are special members of this underclass.”). 
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entrants. Furthermore, Part II identifies the factors the Court has 
used in finding suspect classifications that warrant a heightened 
level of scrutiny. Part II also explains why undocumented children 
should be a “suspect class,” or at least a “quasi-suspect class,” 
based on the factors identified by the Court.   
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND SUSPECT 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
A.  Historical Background: The Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Equal Protection Clause  
1. The Equal Protection Clause  
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that the government cannot deny “any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”17 In other words, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons similarly situated 
must be treated alike.18 However, this does not mean that the 
government cannot make any kind of distinctions under any 
circumstances.19 Despite the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
government may make legal distinctions between individuals if 
such distinctions are justified with adequate rationale.20 Generally, 
courts defer to legislative judgement,21 but in special 
circumstances they subject such classifications to more rigorous 
scrutiny.22 
 
 17 U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV, § 1.  
 18 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); 
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 
(1920) (“[A]ll persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”). 
 19 F. S. Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415 (“It is unnecessary to say that 
the ‘equal protection of the laws’ . . . does not prevent the states from resorting 
to classification for the purposes of legislation.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 
(“[T]he initial discretion to determine what is ‘different’ and what is 'the same' 
resides in the legislatures . . . A legislature must have substantial latitude . . . . ”). 
 20 Plyer, 457 U.S. at 216. For example, the government makes 
constitutionally legal distinctions based on age. The government sets the voting 
age at 18 and the legal age of alcohol consumption at 21.  
 21 Id.  
 22 Id. (“[W]e would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification.”). 
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While written with recently freed slaves in mind,23 the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause are not 
limited solely to race.24 Rather, the Equal Protection Clause was 
intended as a limitation on legislative conduct inconsistent with 
fundamental constitutional principles.25 The point of the Equal 
Protection Clause is to be suspicious of government classifications, 
especially when there is a legal classification that disadvantages a 
“suspect class” or infringes upon a “fundamental right.”26 For 
purposes of this note, I will focus on the former—suspect classes 
and classifications.  
2. Suspect Classification Origins in Equal Protection 
Suspect classifications originate from the famous Footnote 4 of 
the seminal case United States v. Carolene Products Company,27 
and Equal Protection Clause arguments did not truly surface until 
 
 23 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 
552 U.S. 701, 829 (2007) (“The [Fourteenth] Amendment sought to bring into 
American society as full members those whom the Nation had previously held in 
slavery.”); see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (explaining 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose as “securing to a race recently 
emancipated . . . all the civil rights”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 
(1872) (finding the purpose of all Reconstruction amendments to be the “the 
freedom of the slave[s] . . . [and] the security . . . [of] that freedom”). 
 24 See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973) (discussing race, national origin, alienage, indigency, and illegitimacy as 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 
(1971) (discussing national origin and alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (discussing race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) 
(discussing race).  
 25 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).  
 26 Id.  
 27 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); 
Reginald C. Oh, A Critical Linguistic Analysis of Equal Protection Doctrine: 
Are Whites a Suspect Class?, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 583, 593 
(2004) (“The suspect class theory of equal protection is one that originated from 
the theory of judicial review explicated in United States v. Carolene Products 
Footnote Four.”); see also Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of 
the “Insider-Outsider,” 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1986) (explaining the 
famous nature of Carolene Products and the most famous footnote); Lewis F. 
Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982) 
(“Carolene Products retains its fascination solely because of Footnote 4—the 
most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.”).  
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the Warren Court.28 During the first fifty years of its enactment, 
the Equal Protection Clause was rarely invoked.29 To the contrary, 
it was usually seen as the “last resort of constitutional 
arguments.”30 The clause was rarely used because it was often seen 
as intended to protect those freed from slavery.31 However, years 
later, Equal Protection Clause arguments surfaced in conjunction 
with Justice Stone’s famous Footnote 4—opening the door to 
protecting against prejudice for “discrete and insular minorities.”32 
In Carolene Products, the Court reviewed a federal law that 
banned filled milk believed to be injurious to the health of 
people.33 The Court faced the question of whether, in evaluating 
government conduct, a deferential standard was constitutionally 
required under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses.34 The Court answered in favor of a 
deferential review for most legislation—granting government 
 
 28 Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV 135, 143 (2011) (discussing the initial dormant nature of the Equal 
Protection Clause); Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal 
Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO L.J. 89, 
90 (1984) (“The equal protection clause . . . over the last three decades [has] 
been transformed from the ‘last resort of constitutional arguments’ into a 
significant force” in large part as a result of the Warren Court). The Warren 
Court references a period between 1953-1969, where Earl Warren served as the 
Chief Justice. This period is known not only for protecting the rights of citizens 
but also for expanding them. See Ralph Adam Fine, Chief Justice: A Biography 
of Earl Warren, 70-Oct Wis. Law. 47 (1997) (book review).  
 29 Strauss, supra note 28, at 143; Sherry, supra note 28, at 90. 
 30 Strauss, supra note 28; Sherry, supra note 28; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 
200, 208 (1927) (“[The Equal Protection Clause] is the usual last resort of 
constitutional arguments.”); see also Michael Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance 
to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. Rev. 747, 750 & n.12 (1991) (explaining 
how the Supreme Court’s equal protection evaluations “emerged during the 
interwar period from a long hibernation,” and listing examples of the hibernation 
and reawaking periods). 
 31 Strauss, supra note 28, at 142. Early cases rejected extending the 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to other classes and limited its scope 
to the freedom of slaves. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71 
(limiting scope to the protection of former slaves); see generally Minor v. 
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) (focusing the freedom of slave freedom and 
rejecting protections to gender). 
 32 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; Powell, supra note 27. 
 33 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 145.  
 34 Id. at 152 n.4; Strauss, supra note 28. 
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action a constitutional presumption.35 Nonetheless, the Court 
highlighted that “a more searching judicial scrutiny” would apply 
where legislation: (1) appears to be within “a specific prohibition 
of the Constitution;” (2) restricts political processes; or (3) is 
directed at “discrete and insular minorities.”36 This note focuses 
on this third instance. The Court reasoned that when prejudice is 
done against discrete and insular minorities this prejudice 
undercuts the “operation of those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities.”37 
The Court made it clear that legislation hostile to discrete and 
insular minorities would face a higher constitutional hurtle, but it 
did not identify what exactly constituted such “discrete and insular 
minorities.”38 However, years later Justice Powell explained in a 
lecture:  
The theory properly extracted from Footnote 4 . . . 
is roughly as follows: The fundamental character of 
our government is democratic. Our constitution 
assumes that majorities should rule and that the 
government should be able to govern. Therefore, for 
the most part, Congress, and the state legislatures 
should be allowed to do as they choose. But there 
are certain groups that cannot participate effectively 
in the political process. And the political process 
therefore cannot be trusted to protect these groups 
in the way it protects most of us. Consistent with 
these premises, the theory continues, the Supreme 
Court has two special missions in our scheme of 
government: First, to clear away impediments to 
participation, and ensure that all groups can engage 
equally in the political process; and Second, to 
review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical 
 
 35 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 36 Id. (emphasis added). 
 37 Id. (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition . . . curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 38 Id. 
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to discrete and insular minorities who are unable to 
protect themselves in the legislative process.39 
Accordingly, it is the Court’s role to protect certain groups that 
cannot effectively participate in the political process from the 
democratic process itself. To do so, the Court has established that 
classifications that disadvantage a suspect class are presumptively 
invidious, and must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest to pass constitutional muster.40 
3. Scrutiny Standards of Review and Their Effect on Equal 
Protection Cases 
There are three levels of scrutiny that apply to laws that impose 
legal distinctions on different classes under the Equal Protection 
Clause.41 As stated, if a law discriminates against a “suspect class” 
the law is subject to the highest level of scrutiny—strict scrutiny.42 
Under this standard of review, the government must demonstrate it 
has a compelling interest in the distinction and that this 
classification is narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose.43 While 
some laws have survived strict scrutiny, most do not.44  
 
 39 Powell, supra note 27, at 1088-89. 
 40 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).  
 41 Id. at 216-19 (identifying the three main levels of scrutiny through which 
equal protection claims are evaluated and asserting that the highest level of 
scrutiny is warranted to classifications that disadvantage a “suspect class”). 
 42 Id. at 216-17. 
 43 Id. at 217. 
 44 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 948 n.15 
(1975) (arguing that laws subject to strict scrutiny are almost always struck 
down); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1971) (explaining that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory and fatal in fact” in 
comparison to the rational basis standard); see also Strauss, supra note 28, at 
136-137. There have been only a few laws that have survived strict scrutiny. 
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding a raced-based 
classification for affirmative action under strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding a raced-based classification in a military 
ordinance). 
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On the other hand, if a law affects a “quasi-suspect class,” a 
middle-tier level of scrutiny is applied—intermediate scrutiny.45 
Under this standard, the government must demonstrate that the 
classification it is making is rationally related to an important or 
substantial government interest.46 The discrimination does not 
have to be “facially invidious.”47 Some classifications may not be 
facially discriminatory, yet may still give rise to “recurring 
constitutional difficulties” that demand such classifications be 
consistent with the ideals of equal protection.48 Lastly, if a law 
does not affect a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect class,” the 
classification is subject to rational basis.49 Under this scrutiny 
level, the government must show that the classification is 
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.50 This 
 
 45 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16; see also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 
(1978) (subjecting illegitimacy classification to an intermediate scrutiny, where 
it must be “substantially related to permissible state interests”); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 197, 218 (1976) (highlighting the Court’s application “of an 
elevated or ‘intermediate’ level scrutiny” for gender classifications and stating 
that the classification “must serve important governmental objectives and must 
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”). 
 46 Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197, 218 (emphasis added).  
 47 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 489 
(2004) (“So long as a classification is neither suspect nor quasi-suspect, the 
Court promises that it will give every beneficial presumption to the government 
when assessing the validity of differential treatment.”).  
 50  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (“In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most 
forms of state action, we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at 
issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.”) (emphasis 
added); Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper 
Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 685, 693-94 (2008) (“[T]he concept of rational basis 
review—the idea that all legislation at a minimum must be rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose—generally is not controversial. Minimum 
judicial review to evaluate the constitutionality of laws is consistent with 
preserving the supremacy of federal law, particularly the Constitution . . . . ”); 
see generally McCulloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (establishing rational basis 
and asking that “the end be legitimate . . . within the scope of the constitution . . 
. and [that all appropriate] means. . . [be] plainly adapted to that end . . . [and] 
consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution”). 
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standard of review enjoys high deference, and thus, most laws 
often survive it.51 
As a result, whether a law discriminates against a “suspect,” 
“quasi-suspect,” or “non-suspect” group can determine the 
outcome of an equal protection claim. Laws discriminating against 
non-suspect groups are subject to and often pass rational basis.52 
On the other hand, laws discriminating against suspect classes are 
subject to and often do not survive strict scrutiny.53 If a group is 
considered a suspect class, it will have a substantial effect on the 
outcome of an equal protection case, as it is likely that the law in 
question will be found unconstitutional.  
4. Undocumented Aliens and Equal Protection 
Undocumented aliens are afforded the guaranteed protections 
of the Equal Protection Clause.54 In Plyler, the Court struck down 
a Texas law that denied undocumented children public school 
education.55 Texas argued that undocumented aliens were “not 
persons within the jurisdiction” of the State of Texas and, thus, 
were not entitled to the equal protection of Texas law.56 The Court 
rejected this argument. The Court held that whatever the legal 
status of a person may be under immigration law, “an alien is 
surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.”57 The Court 
further stated that even undocumented aliens “have long been 
recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”58 The Court left no doubt that 
aliens, regardless of status, are entitled to the constitutional 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.59 
 
 51  Goldberg, supra note 49, at 489 (highlighting the Court’s deference in 
“upholding over one hundred classifications on rational basis review since 
1973”); see also Gunther, supra note 44, at 8 (identifying rational basis as 
“minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact”).  
 52 Gunther, supra note 44, at 8; see also Wilkinson, supra note 44, at 948. 
 53 Wilkinson, supra note 44, at 948. 
 54 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210.  
 55 Id. at 205, 210.  
 56 Id. at 210.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. at 215 (“The Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or 
stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a 
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B.  Suspect Classifications: A Closer Look 
1. Current Suspect Classifications: An Unclear Standard 
While the Court has identified at least three suspect 
classifications—race, national origin, and alienage—60 it has not 
identified with particular precision what constitutes a suspect 
class.61 In Plyler, the Court admitted that several “formulations 
might explain . . . [their] treatment of certain classifications as 
‘suspect.’”62 Nonetheless, it did not identify with clarity what 
factors were used to find a class suspect, nor if every factor 
identified had to be met.63  
Instead, the Court only explained that some suspect 
classifications: (1) “are more likely than others to reflect deep 
seated prejudice;” (2) “tend to be irrelevant to any proper 
legislative goal;” and (3) “have historically been relegated to . . . a 
position of political powerlessness.”64 Aside from these tentative 
factors found in a footnote of the case, Plyler did not shed much 
light on the “suspect class factors.” Similarly, the Court did not 
provide any further elaboration when it held distinctions based on 
 
State’s territory.”); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . provisions are universal in their application, to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of 
race, of color, or of nationality . . . . ”); Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228, 238 
(1853) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford 
protections to all within the boundaries of a State).  
 60 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973) 
(discussing race as the prime example of a suspect classification and identifying 
national origin, alienage, indigency and illegitimacy as other classifications in 
some settings); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (discussing national 
origin and alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing race); 
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480-81 (1954) (discussing national origin); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (discussing race); CORNELL 
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Suspect Classification, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/suspect_classification (last visited Mar. 6, 
2019) [hereinafter Cornell LII] (“There are four generally agreed-upon suspect 
classifications: race, religion, national origin, and alienage. However, this is not 
an inclusive list.”).  
 61 Wilkinson, supra note 44, at 983 (“[T]he suspect class is . . . an unruly 
horse which the Court refuses to tame.”); Strauss, supra note 28, at 147.  
 62 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14 (emphasis added).  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 233 (emphasis added). 
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national origin were subject to rigid scrutiny in Oyama v. 
California.65 Again, the Court provided no explanation in Graham 
v. Richardson when it held that “aliens as a class are a prime 
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom . . . 
heightened judicial solitude is appropriate.”66  
Since 1971, the Court has been reluctant to identify a new 
suspect class.67 Without any recent decisions explaining what 
constitutes a suspect class, it is worth assessing already established 
suspect classes and classifications. By analyzing current classes 
and closely examining the Court’s reasoning for identifying them 
as “suspect” or “non-suspect” will help pinpoint the set of factors 
traditionally considered. This list of factors will set the stage for 
subsequent analysis in Part II.  
2. The First Suspect Classification: Race  
The first established suspect classification, although not 
explicit at first, was race.68 The Court first referenced race as 
warranting heightened scrutiny in 1944 in Korematsu v. United 
States.69 There, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a 
Civilian Exclusion Order that subjected all persons of Japanese 
 
 65 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (finding that 
discrimination based on national origin or distinctions between citizens on the 
basis of their racial descent are by their very nature “odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality”). 
 66 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 67 Emily K. Baxter, Rationalizing Away Political Powerless: Equal 
Protection Analysis of Laws Classifying Gays and Lesbians, 72 MO. L. REV. 
891, 894 (2007) (“Since its last designation of alienage as a suspect 
classification in 1971 and its designation of gender and illegitimacy as quasi-
suspect classifications in 1977, the Court has refused to declare that any new 
groups are suspect or quasi-suspect classifications, including the elderly, the 
mentally disabled, and the poor.”); see also EVAN GERSTMANN, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-
BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 24 (University of Chicago Press, 1st ed. 1999); see, 
e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. 365 (finding aliens are a suspect class in 1971); Mass. 
Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (rejecting that the elderly are a 
suspect or quasi suspect class in 1976); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding that the mentally retarded are not a 
quasi-suspect classification in 1985); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) 
(finding that “financial need alone” does not create “a suspect class” in 1977). 
 68 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
 69 Id.   
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ancestry to a curfew during World War II.70 The Court found the 
order was constitutional.71 Yet, the Court stated that “all legal 
restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial restriction 
are immediately suspect” and must be subject to the “most rigid 
scrutiny.”72 In 1964 in McLaughlin v. Florida, the Court 
reaffirmed race restrictions as immediately suspect.73 Using strict 
scrutiny, the Court struck down an anti-miscegenation state law 
that prohibited the cohabitation of men and women of different 
races.74 Korematsu and McLaughlin both found that race triggered 
the highest level of scrutiny, but neither provided much 
explanation as to why.  
3. The Beginning of a Criteria: Rejecting Suspect 
Classification Claims 
The Court began to provide meaning to discrete and insular 
minorities that warrant constitutional protection as it struck down 
suspect classification claims in the 1970s.75 Additionally, it was in 
1973 that the Court first used the term “suspect class” when 
referencing discrete and insular minorities.76 In its 1973 San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez decision, the 
Court declined to extend suspect class status to the poor in an equal 
 
 70 Id. at 216-17. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. Although the Court signals a use of strict scrutiny, it is believed that 
the Court’s scrutiny analysis more closely resembles rational basis. The Court 
provided great deference to the Military, who argued it was too difficult to 
identify who was loyal and disloyal among the Japanese during World War II. 
The government argued that excluding all people of Japanese descent was the 
best way to achieve their compelling interest of national security. Korematsu is 
the last time the Court upheld a discriminatory law on its face. 
 73 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (citing Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) and Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216) (“[W]e deal 
here with classification based upon race . . . [which is] ‘constitutionally suspect;’ 
and subject to the ‘most rigid scrutiny . . . . ’”). 
 74 Id. at 184.  
 75 Strauss, supra note 28, at 144-45; Reginald, supra note 27, at 594-95. 
 76 Reginald, supra note 27, at 594-95; see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 28 (1973). 
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protection challenge to a public-school funding scheme,77 and it 
subject the scheme to rational basis.78 The Court explained: 
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it 
defines have none of the traditional indicia of 
suspectness: the class is not saddled with such 
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process . . . . We thus conclude that the 
Texas system does not operate to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any suspect class.79 
In rejecting suspect class status to the poor, the Court 
highlighted the relevance of historical unequal treatment or 
subordination, as well as the importance of assessing any political 
powerlessness or democratic defect.80 These same factors were 
reiterated when the Court declined to extent suspect or quasi-
suspect classification status to age and mental disability.81 In 
particular, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the 
Court relied substantially on the history of discrimination against 
the mentally disabled, their political power or representation in the 
legislature, and the relevance of their disabled status to government 
legislation.82 
 
 77 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.  
 78 Id. at 55 (“The constitutional standard . . . is whether the challenged state 
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest.”). 
 79 Id. at 28 (emphasis added).  
 80 Id. at 17-29; Strauss, supra note 28, at 144-45; Reginald, supra note 27, 
at 594-95. 
 81 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (rejecting 
age); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985) 
(rejecting mentally disabled). 
 82 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-42, 445 (holding that continuous 
legislation protecting the mentally disabled is evidence of a lack of prejudice or 
antipathy but rather proves that this group is well represented and not politically 
powerless).  
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4. Adding to the Criteria: Creating Quasi-Suspect 
Classifications 
  The Court created a more solid standard when it began to 
extend “quasi-suspect” status to discriminated classes. In 1973, the 
Court found that gender was a “quasi-suspect classification.”83 In 
Frontiero v. Richardson, only female officers were required to 
show spousal dependency from their partners for military 
benefits.84 The Court applied stricter scrutiny to the military 
regulation that placed the additional burden of proof on female 
officers but not on male officers and their spouses.85 The plurality 
held that gender-based classifications, “like classifications based 
upon race, alienage or national origin, are inherently suspect and 
must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”86 The Court also 
highlighted that gender was not relevant to a male or female’s 
ability to perform and that sex was an immutable characteristic 
“determined solely by the accident of birth.”87 A few years later, in 
Craig v. Boren, where a statute set the legal drinking age at 21 for 
males and 18 for females, the Court affirmed gender as a quasi-
suspect classification.88 The Court struck down the law under 
intermediate scrutiny and reaffirmed immutability and relevancy as 
important factors to consider when evaluating if a group is a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class that warrants stricter scrutiny 
protections.89   
5. Illegal Alienage Not a Suspect Class 
Alienage is a suspect classification, but illegal alienage is not.90 
In Plyler, the Court found that aliens, regardless of status, are 
 
 83 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 678. For administrative convenience, spouses of male Air Force 
members were dependents for the purpose of military benefits. But spouses of 
female members were not dependents unless they showed they depended on 
more than 50 percent on their wife’s support.  
 86 Id. at 688.  
 87 Id. at 686. 
 88 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (finding alienage is 
a suspect class), and Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (declining to extend suspect class 
status to undocumented aliens). 
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entitled to the constitutional protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.91 However, while the Court struck down a state law 
that denied education to undocumented children, it rejected the 
claim that undocumented aliens are a suspect class.92 In arriving at 
its conclusion, the Court placed a special weight on the voluntary 
nature of the classification.93 The Court reasoned that unlike most 
classifications recognized as suspect, this particular classification 
was a product of “voluntary action” and not an immutable 
characteristic.94 Additionally, the Court added that unauthorized 
presence in the country was not a “constitutional irrelevancy” nor 
was education a fundamental right.95 Therefore, the state did not 
need to justify through the strictest constitutional scrutiny the 
manner in which they chose to educate their population.96 
Consequently, Plyler held that because an undocumented entrant 
willingly enters the country in violation of the law, and his or her 
unlawful presence may be constitutionally relevant to government 
legislation, illegal alienage is not a suspect classification.97 
 
 91 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and 
reaches into every corner of a State’s territory”); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . . provisions are universal 
in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without 
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality”); Wong Wing v. 
U.S., 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1853) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to afford protections to all within the boundaries of a State).  
 92 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 206, 224. 
 93 Id. at 219 n.19 (“Unlike most classifications . . . recognized as suspect, 
entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of 
voluntary action.”). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 223 (“[I]t could hardly be suggested that undocumented status is a 
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ With respect to the actions of the Federal 
Government, alienage classifications may be intimately related to the conduct of 
foreign policy, to the federal prerogative to control access to the United States, 
and to the plenary federal power to determine who has sufficiently manifested 
his allegiance to become a citizen of the Nation.”). 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id. at 219 n.19, 223.  
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6. The “Suspect” Evaluation: A Summary  
Generally, to determine whether a group is considered a 
“discrete and insular minority” and should be extended suspect 
classification status, a multi-factor assessment is necessary.98 
Based on Supreme Court cases that identify a suspect 
classification, decline to extend the status, or only extend partial 
quasi-suspect status, the relevant factors include, but are not 
limited to, the following:  
(1) Signs of prejudice, subordination, or history of 
discrimination against the group—indicating the 
class has been historically disadvantaged; 
(2) Political powerlessness or the lack of effective 
representation in the political process—
indicating the group’s inability to seek political 
redress due to underrepresentation, indifference, 
or stereotypes; and  
(3) Immutability of the group’s defining 
characteristic or trait.99  
If the group in question meets most factors, if not all, it is more 
likely that a court will find it to be a suspect class and, thus, subject 
their Equal Protection claims to strict scrutiny. On the contrary, if 
the group satisfies less factors, the more likely the courts will find 
the group is a quasi-suspect or non-suspect class, and the more 
likely it will subject its claims to a lower standard of scrutiny. Part 
II below will group the common factors used to determine who is a 
suspect class for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Additionally, Part II will apply the factors to the class of 
undocumented minor children.  
 
 98 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 99 See generally  Cornell LII, supra note 60; Strauss, supra note 28, at 148-
67; Sherry, supra note 28, at 108-14; see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202; Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365 (1971); McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Oyama v. 
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
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C.  Children of Undocumented Entrants: A Challenge to 
Principles of Equality Under Law 
In addition to understanding the history of the Equal Protection 
Clause, its application to all people “whether citizens or 
strangers,”100 and the evolution of suspect classifications, it is also 
important to understand the undocumented alien class and the 
subgroup at issue—minor children of the undocumented 
entrants.101 The Court has noted several factors led to the “creation 
of a substantial overall ‘shadow population’” of undocumented 
aliens.102 According to the Court in 1982, 
This situation raises the specter of a permanent cast 
of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by 
some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but 
nevertheless denied the benefits that our society 
makes available to citizens and lawful residents. 
The existence of such an underclass presents most 
difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on 
adherence to principles of equality under law.103 
Almost forty years later, this is still the case. Illegal 
immigration continues to be a social, economic, and political 
problem for the United States today. However, the purpose of this 
note is not to argue against or for immigration. This note presents a 
legal argument as to why minor children of undocumented entrants 
are distinct from undocumented adult entrants,104 and, thus, should 
not be grouped together under a single “illegal alien” class. Rather, 
the undocumented youth should be extended suspect or quasi-
suspect class status on their own merit.  
 
 100 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982). 
 101 See supra note 14 for a list of the terms used in this note to refer to 
undocumented children. 
 102 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 (listing “lax enforcement of laws” and 
“employment of undocumented aliens” as two causes). 
 103 Id. at 218-19. 
 104 Id. at 219. (“The children . . . are special members of this underclass.”). 
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1. Plyler and the Undocumented Youth: A “Discrete Class” 
Not Comparably Situated 
The children of undocumented entrants are not comparably 
situated.105 Plyler focused generally on undocumented adult 
entrants and why they would not be considered a suspect class.106 
The Court used a rationale unique to undocumented adult entrants 
to weakly find that undocumented children too are not entitled to a 
more rigorous level of scrutiny.107 The Court’s reasoning that the 
voluntary nature of a class makes a class not suspect does not 
apply with the same force to the minor children of illegal entrants, 
as the Court itself explicitly highlighted.108 In Plyler, the Court 
explained that the discrimination of the undocumented youth 
imposed “a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not 
accountable for their disabling status.”109 The Court suggested that 
children are innocent and are being excluded only because of a 
status resulting from the violation of a third party and not their own 
volition.110 As such, if we look closely at the reasons listed to 
decline extending suspect status to illegal aliens and their focus on 
adult entrant characteristics, it is difficult to rationalize why it 
extends to the undocumented youth. 
Persuasive arguments exist for the government to withhold 
benefits from those “whose very presence within the United States 
is a product of their own unlawful conduct,” but these arguments 
do not apply to children of the undocumented entrants.111 The 
Court in Plyler explained, “‘[P]arents [of undocumented children] 
 
 105 Id. at 220. 
 106 See id. 
 107 Id. at 223. 
 108 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20 (“[A]rguments [about the consequences of 
own unlawful conduct] do not apply with the same force to classifications 
imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants.”). 
 109 Id. at 223. 
 110 Id. at 220; see id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring) (“They are excluded 
only because of a status resulting from the violation by parents or guardians of 
our immigration laws and the fact that they remain in our country unlawfully. 
The . . . children are innocent in this respect. They can ‘affect neither their 
parents’ conduct nor their own status.’”) (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 
762, 770 (1977)). 
 111 Id. at 219-20 (“[T]hose who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in 
violation of our law should be prepared to face the consequences . . . . ”). 
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have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms,’ and 
presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State’s 
jurisdiction; but the children . . . in these cases ‘can affect neither 
their parents’ conduct nor their own status.’”112 The Court 
additionally reiterated that punishing children for an action outside 
their control went contrary to the basic concept of our legal 
system.113 That is, the American principle that imposes legal 
consequences in relation to individual wrongdoing.114 The Court 
noted:  
[Visiting] condemnation on the head of an infant is 
illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities 
on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of 
our system that legal burdens should bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for 
his birth and penalizing the . . . child is an 
ineffectual—as well as unjust—way of deterring the 
parent.”115 Even if the State found it expedient to 
control the conduct of adults by acting against their 
children, legislation directing the onus of a parent’s 
misconduct against his children does not comport 
with fundamental conceptions of justice.116 
Lastly, the Court found that legal status is not completely 
irrelevant to Federal legislative goals, nonetheless, the immutable 
nature of the status in children deserved particular attention.117 The 
Court wrote:  
Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant      
. . . . Nor is undocumented status an absolutely 
immutable characteristic [in adults] since it is the 
product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action.     
 
 112 Id. (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 (internal quotations omitted)). 
 113 Id. at 220. 
 114 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote omitted)). 
 115 Id. (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote omitted)). 
 116 Id. 
 117 See id.  
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But . . . [when a classification] is directed against 
children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on 
the basis of a legal characteristic over which 
children can have little control. It is thus difficult to 
conceive of a rational justification for penalizing 
these children . . . . 118 
As it made these observations, the Court highlighted that 
undocumented children’s entrance into this class was not a result 
of voluntary action.119 Rather, minor children obtained their status 
through no fault of their own.120 Additionally, the Court visited a 
core basic principle of our legal system that demands legal burdens 
be proportional to self-wrongdoing.121 The Court, thus, alluded that 
imposing legal burdens on a “discrete class” that is not accountable 
for its own “disabling status” is inconsistent with American 
principles.122  
Consequently, Plyler illustrates a legal application error when 
classifying minor undocumented children. The Court could not 
justify how undocumented children are responsible for their legal 
status nor that children should face the consequences. Yet, the 
Court ignored its findings and concluded that all undocumented 
aliens, including the children, are not a suspect class because of the 
voluntary nature of the entrance into the class.123 However, like 
most other established suspect classes, undocumented children do 
not voluntarily enter into this class.124  
2. Plyler is Not Rational Basis, But a Heightened Scrutiny 
The Plyler Court subjected the Texas State law that 
discriminated against undocumented children to heightened 
scrutiny, even though it found that illegal alienage was not a 
 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id.  
 120 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). 
 121 See id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 
175 (1972) (footnote omitted)). 
 122 Id. at 223. 
 123 Id. at 219 n.19 (“[E]ntry into this class by virtue of entry into this country 
is the product of voluntary action”). 
 124 See id. at 220. 
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suspect class.125 This further demonstrates that undocumented 
children are a special class not comparably situated to the illegal 
alienage class as a whole. The Court in Plyler stated that 
discrimination imposed on the children “could hardly be 
considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the 
state.”126 While it is not altogether clear, the Court seems to signal 
a rational basis standard but ends up applying something else.127 
The language used in Plyler (i.e. “substantial goal”) signals the use 
of a constitutional scrutiny that is greater than rational basis but 
less than strict scrutiny.128  
Consequently, although the Court holds that illegal alienage is 
not a suspect class, its reasoning resting on adult characteristics,129 
its explicit statements that minor children are a special “discrete 
class” not accountable for their “disabling status,”130 and its use of 
a scrutiny level other than rational basis131 help establish that 
undocumented minor children are distinct from undocumented 
adult entrants. As such, the characteristics used and described in 
Plyler cannot be used to deny suspect class status to undocumented 
children. Rather, because of this and the reasoning set forth in Part 
II of this note,132 minor children of undocumented entrants should 
be extended suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 
3. The Undocumented Population and Undocumented Youth   
Before analyzing why discrimination of this class should be 
subject to heightened scrutiny, it is important to understand the 
 
 125 See id. at 223-24. 
 126 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. 
 127 See id. The Court is believed to have used “Rational Basis with Bite” or 
Intermediate Scrutiny. Rational basis review traditionally requires a rational 
relationship between the means and a legitimate government interest. On the 
other hand, “Rational Basis with Bite” is less deferential and requires that “the 
government bears the burden of establishing the actual reason for the law that 
would be advanced by applying the law on the facts . . . . ” With “Rational Basis 
with Bite” the plaintiff’s odds of prevailing increases. Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., 
If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the 
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (2008). 
 128 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. 
 129 Id. at 219-20.  
 130 Id. at 223. 
 131 See id. at 224. 
 132 See discussion infra Part II.  
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makeup of the overall group and the subgroup in question. Today, 
according to the most recent estimate from the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), it is estimated that over twelve million 
immigrants live in the United States without proper 
documentation.133 That is between 3.3 and 3.7 percent of the total 
U.S. population.134 It is estimated that about eighty percent of the 
group have been in the United States for more than ten years.135 On 
the other hand, determining the makeup of the undocumented 
 
 133 U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), Office of Immigration 
Statistics, Population Estimates: Illegal Alien Population Residing in the United 
States: January 2015 1, 2 (2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_1214_PLCY_pops-est-
report.pdf [hereinafter DHS Population Estimates]. The Department of 
Homeland security estimations reflect numbers as of 2015. Two independent 
groups estimations reflect similar numbers. The Pew Research Center estimates 
the number of undocumented immigrants at 10.7 million in 2016, while the 
Center for Migration Studies estimates approximately 10.8 million people. All 
three estimation reports use Census Bureau data on the total foreign-born 
population and subtract the legal immigrant population. The reports show a 
continued decline in the undocumented population since 2010. See Jens Manuel 
Krogstad et al., 5 facts about illegal immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER fig.1, Nov. 28, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/11/28/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/; Robert Warren, 
The US Undocumented Population Fell Sharply During the Obama Era: 
Estimates for 2016, CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES NEW YORK (CMS), Feb. 
22, 2018, https://cmsny.org/publications/warren-undocumented-2016/. See 
generally Robert Warren, U.S. Undocumented Population Continued to Fall 
from 2016 to 2017, and Visa Overstays Significantly Exceeded Illegal Crossings 
for the Seventh Consecutive Year, CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES NEW 
YORK (CMS), Jan. 16, 2019, https://cmsny.org/publications/essay-2017-
undocumented-and-overstays/. 
 134 Lori Robertson, Illegal Immigration Statistics, FACTCHECK.ORG, June 28, 
2018, https://www.factcheck.org/2018/06/illegal-immigration-statistics/; U.S. 
Census Bureau, National Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-
2018 (2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-national-total.html#par_textimage_2011805803; see 
also Lori Robertson & Factcheck.org, Illegal immigration: Separating the facts 
from fiction, USA TODAY, June 30, 2018, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/30/illegal-immigration-
facts-children-immigrants/747934002/ [hereinafter USA Today: Facts from 
Fiction]. 
 135 DHS Population Estimates, supra note 133, at 4. In 2014 only 5 percent 
of undocumented immigrants came to the U.S. in the previous five years. USA 
Today: Facts from Friction, supra note 134. 
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youth is difficult. However, the latest numbers estimate about 1.1 
million undocumented minors make up this subgroup.136 Thus, the 
undocumented youth make up almost ten percent of the total 
undocumented population.137  
The children of undocumented entrants are special members of 
the illegal alien class.138 Subsequently, arguments that apply to 
adult undocumented entrants do not apply “with the same force” to 
this class of minor children.139 The undocumented youth faces 
distinctive legal uncertainties and challenges.140 These limitations 
continue into an even more complicated adulthood for those unable 
to adjust their status—a status obtained through no fault of their 
own.141 The Court made a note of this in Plyler.142 The Court 
found it hard to justify that these undocumented children are 
responsible for their legal status and, therefore, should face the 
consequences.143 Nevertheless, the Court turned a blind eye on its 
findings and concluded that all undocumented aliens, including the 
uniquely situated children, are not a suspect class.144 In addition to 
this inconsistency, there are other reasons why undocumented 
children warrant heightened scrutiny. Part II uses the suspect 
classification factors set forth by the Court when declining or 
extending suspect class status to also arrive at this conclusion.  
 
 136 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration 
Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade, PEW HISPANIC CENTER 1, 4, Sept. 
1, 2010, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2010/09/01/us-unauthorized-immigration-
flows-are-down-sharply-since-mid-decade/ (“The number of children who are 
unauthorized, 1.1 million in 2009, declined slightly over the decade. By contrast, 
the population of U.S.-born children with at least one unauthorized parent nearly 
doubled from 2000 to 2009, when they numbered 4 million.”).  
 137 See id. 
 138 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 (highlighting that “[t]he children… are special 
members of this underclass”). 
 139 Id. at 219-20.  
 140 See Leisy Janet Abrego, "I Can’t Go to College Because I Don't Have 
Papers:” Incorporation Patterns Of Latino Undocumented Youth, 4 LATINO 
STUDIES 212, 217 (2006). This subgroup is often called the 1.5 generation, as 
they may have been born in a foreign country but have spent a majority of life in 
the United States. Although some adjust their legal status, many remain 
undocumented, see id. at 213, n.2. 
 141 See, e.g., id. at 224. 
 142 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220, 223. 
 143 See id.  
 144 Id. at 219 n.19. 
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III. IDENTIFYING A SUSPECT CLASS: CARVING OUT AN 
EXCEPTION 
To evaluate if undocumented children are a suspect class 
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny, the Court considers the 
same factors that led to heightened scrutiny for race.145 Several of 
these factors are discussed in Part (I)(B)(3), (4), and (6) of this 
note.146 This section groups together all factors and puts forward a 
four-part analysis. The more factors met, the more likely it is for 
the Court to extend suspect class status, warranting heightened 
scrutiny to the group in question.  
The Court in Plyler declined to extend suspect class status to 
illegal aliens.147 This note finds that the Court ruled in part 
correctly and in part erroneously. While adults voluntarily become 
a part of this class by virtue of entry into this country and fall short 
of suspect status,148 undocumented children do not. Plyler correctly 
held that illegal alienage is not a suspect class, but incorrectly and 
over-inclusively included the minor children of these 
undocumented entrants in its holding. After analyzing the 
subgroup below through the four-part analysis, this note argues 
that undocumented juvenile aliens are a “suspect” or at least a 
“quasi-suspect” class entitled to higher constitutional scrutiny.  
A.  Original Intent and Its Understanding  
While the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose was to eliminate 
race-based classifications,149 the spirit of the Fourteenth 
 
 145 See discussion supra Part I (B) (3), (4), & (6); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-43 (1985). 
 146 See discussion supra Part I (B) (3), (4), & (6); e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 
U.S. 432; Plyler, 457 U.S. 202; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); 
McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Oyama v. California, 332 
U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated 
by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 147 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.  
 148 Id. at 219-20. 
 149 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
829 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The [Fourteenth] Amendment sought to 
bring into American society as full members those whom the Nation had 
previously held in slavery.”) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 
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Amendment extends to multiple additional classifications.150 The 
first step in our analysis to determine if undocumented children are 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment is to understand the 
intent of the Amendment itself. Focusing on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s intent and textual interpretation provides insight as 
to what classifications the amendment intended to eliminate.151 A 
closer look at the Fourteenth Amendment illustrates that its 
purpose and original understanding was to afford free slaves the 
equal opportunity to participate in American society.152 One may 
argue that at the time of the ratification the drafters did not intend 
to provide equality in all circumstances. Rather, the drafters 
intended to provide equality only to African Americans. It may 
also be argued that that the drafters did not have the “discrete class 
of undocumented children”153 in mind when ratifying the 
amendment, thus, the amendment was not written to eliminate this 
classification. However, as illustrated in Part I of this note, the 
spirit of race classifications applies to other classifications, 
including that of minor children of undocumented entrants.154  
Even if the overarching principle of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to promote racial equality, the interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment has changed over time.155 The 
 
306 (1880) (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose as “securing to a 
race recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights”)); Slaughter–House Cases, 83 
U.S. 36, 71 (1872) (finding the purpose of all Reconstruction amendments to be 
the “the freedom of the slave[s] . . . [and] the security . . . that freedom”). 
 150 See generally Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (discussing race, national origin, 
alienage, indigency, and illegitimacy); Graham, 403 U.S. 365 (discussing 
national origin and alienage); Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing race);  
Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (discussing race). 
 151 Jennifer Huffman, Justice Rehnquist and Alienage as a Suspect 
Classification, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 845, 849-50 (1993); see also Sugarman v. 
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649-50 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 152 Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 490 
(1954); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 829. 
 153 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. 
 154 See discussion supra Part I (A) & (B); see generally Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1; Graham, 403 U.S. 365; McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S. 184 
(1964); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.  
 155 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“History and 
tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. 
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Fourteenth Amendment has been adapted to eliminate not only 
race-based classifications but also alienage and national origin 
based-classifications.156 Additionally, the Court has explicitly 
stated that even undocumented aliens “have long been recognized 
as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”157 The Court has left no doubt that 
aliens, regardless of their status, are entitled to the protections of 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.158  
Furthermore, a closer textual analysis illustrates that the 
original intent of the Equal Protection Clause was to protect any 
“person.”159 According to the Equal Protection Clause’s drafters, 
the amendment’s scope applies to “any person,” which reflects a 
textual based intention to protect all people, not just those 
discriminated against based on their race.160 This interpretation is 
also supported by cases where the Court utilized the Equal 
Protection Clause to reach beyond race to other classifications.161 
Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause is generally forward-
looking, meaning that its interpretation reflects modern social 
values and should not be limited to protecting only one 
classification.162 Consequently, the Equal Protection Clause 
 
That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past 
alone to rule the present.”) (citing Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003)). 
 156 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 61.  
 157 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 n.9 (“It would be incongruous to hold that the 
United States . . . is barred from invidious discrimination with respect to 
unlawful aliens, while excepting states from a similar limitation.”) (citing 
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1976)); Wong Wing v. United States, 
163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed 
to afford protections to all within the boundaries of a State); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . . provisions 
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, 
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality . . . . ”). 
 158 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment extends to 
anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches 
into every corner of a State’s territory.”); see discussion supra Part (I) (A) (4).  
 159 U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. 
at 215. 
 160 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. 
 161 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). 
 162 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
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extends to classifications imposed on the undocumented youth 
class.  
This first factor supports giving undocumented children 
suspect class status. 
B.  Classification Rarely Relevant for Legitimate Government 
Purpose 
Next, it is important to evaluate whether the classification the 
government is trying to make is relevant to achieve a legitimate 
state objective.163 Relevancy helps the Court determine if the 
legislature’s judgement is clouded with bias or stereotypes against 
the class in question, or if the political process is protecting the 
group.164 Strict scrutiny applies where the government’s 
classification is rarely relevant to a legitimate legislative 
objective.165 On the other hand, intermediate scrutiny may be 
appropriate where it is sometimes relevant,166 while rational basis 
review is appropriate where the classification is often relevant.167 
For example, race is rarely relevant to a legitimate state interest.168 
One of the very limited instances where race may be relevant is 
 
 163 Goldberg, supra note 49, at 537 (“[S]keptical scrutiny will not follow if 
the trait plausibly can be the basis for differential treatment in a variety of 
contexts; but if the trait is so irrelevant to abilities that its use as the basis for 
differential treatment is likely to be arbitrary, regardless of the context, 
heightened scrutiny may be accorded.”).  
 164 Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a 
Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting 
People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 57 (2005) (“The Court’s ‘tiers 
of scrutiny’ can be understood as a way to tie the level of scrutiny to a 
classification’s likely relevance. Thus strict scrutiny is appropriate for 
classifications . . . which are almost never relevant . . . . ”); Strauss, supra note 
28, at 145, 164-65.  
 165 Aukerman, supra note 164, at 57. 
 166 Id.  
 167 Id. 
 168 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-99 (1978) 
(discussing race-based distinctions and their inherent suspect nature); Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect.”). 
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Affirmative Action.169 Consequently, if race is used to make legal 
distinctions, the Court is automatically suspicious, as race-based 
classifications are rarely relevant to any legitimate state 
objective.170 
The Court frequently relies on the relevancy factor to evaluate 
the level of trust it should place in the political process.171 
Relevancy was a tipping factor in declining to extend suspect 
classification to age and mental disability.172 In assessing age, the 
Court held in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents that, in 
comparison to race or gender, government conduct based on age 
could not be characterized as “seldom relevant” to achieve any 
legitimate state interest.173 Those considerations were based on 
“prejudice and antipathy.”174 Similarly, in City of Cleburne, the 
Court found that the mentally disabled’s “reduced ability to cope 
with and function in everyday world” was not rarely relevant.175 
The mentally disabled’s immutability in this case was relevant, and 
 
 169 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding a raced-based 
classification for affirmative action under strict scrutiny); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
291-99 n.36.  
 170 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216). 
 171 Aukerman, supra note 164; Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis 
with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge its Application of 
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2775 (2005) (discussing the importance of relevancy 
and finding that “a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or 
deserving as others . . . [t]he lack of a relationship between a law and the 
characteristic against which it discriminates indicates that the law is not a result 
of ‘legislative rationality’ . . . but rather a reflection of ‘deep-seated prejudice’”) 
(quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.4 (1982) (quoting City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)); Strauss, supra note 28, at 
145. 
 172 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (quoting City of 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43. 
 173 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting City of 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440). 
 174 Id.  
 175 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, 443. The Court struck down a city 
ordinance that denied a permit operation to a group home under rational basis. 
The Court found the discrimination was based on irrational prejudices against 
the mentally disabled. It is important to note that in this case the Court used laws 
dealing with mentality disabled as a plus factor in finding relevancy to 
legislative objectives, see id. at 450. 
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the state’s interest to deal with it and pass beneficial laws for the 
class, such as the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill 
of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(1), (2), was “plainly a legitimate 
one.”176 In both of these instances, the Court found that it should 
not automatically be suspicious of classifications whose 
characteristics were relevant for legitimate government 
purposes.177 Rather, the Court should be suspicious of 
classifications that are rarely relevant for legitimate government 
purposes.  
Classifications based on the status of minor children are not 
often relevant to accomplish a legitimate state objective. Aside 
from foreign policy, determination of nationality, and general 
federal immigration policy, the Court should be suspicious of laws 
using the illegality of a minor to discriminate against this class.178 
As Plyler demonstrated, state classifications that discriminate 
against minor children are hardly considered rational.179 A law 
targeting undocumented minor children is often based on prejudice 
and animosity towards immigration.180 Nevertheless, even if a 
Court were to find that the status of minor children was relevant to 
a legitimate state objective, it does not mean that heightened 
scrutiny should not be applied.181 In Grutter, while upholding a 
race-based classification for affirmative action programs, the Court 
highlighted that just because a classification was relevant to 
government action it did not make classifications any less 
suspicious in the eyes of the Equal Protection Clause.182  
This factor leans towards suspect or quasi-suspect class status.  
 
 176 Id. at 442-46 (“Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the 
government may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions, and 
because both State and Federal Governments have recently committed 
themselves to assisting the retarded, we will not presume that any given 
legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in 
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.”). 
 177 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.  
 178 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982). 
 179 Id. at 224 (“[T]he discrimination contained . . . can hardly be considered 
rational . . . . ”). 
 180 See discussion infra Part II (C). 
 181 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (discussing why 
heighten scrutiny does not mean or require that a classification be never 
relevant). 
 182 Id.  
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C.  Subordination or History of Discrimination 
The next factor that is important to analyze is subordination or 
the group’s history of discrimination. If the classification being 
used is generally used to subordinate or create a caste system, 
courts are immediately suspicious.183 In Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, Shawnee City, Kansas, the Court struck 
down the Separate but Equal Doctrine.184 In doing so, the Court 
found the goal of segregation was subordination and the creation of 
a caste system that raises one group over another.185 The Court 
found that the presence of subordination alerted to inherent 
suspicion and this factor favored a heighten level of scrutiny 
towards the statutes in question.186 Similarly, almost thirty-one 
years later, the Court in Cleburne found subordination and the 
history of discrimination to be an important factor when deciding 
whether the mentally disabled were a suspect class.187 The Court 
found that laws or regulations passed for the benefit of mentally 
disabled people were evidence against discrimination or 
 
 183 Smith, supra note 171, at 2774-75 (discussing laws subject to strict 
scrutiny and finding that these laws are likely to hold “a view that those in the 
burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others”) (quoting City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)); see also Darren 
Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The 
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 636 (2003) (“To obtain suspect class status, a group 
must demonstrate that it has suffered a history of discrimination.”). 
 184 Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495 
(1954) (“We conclude that . . . the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no 
place.”). 
 185 Id. at 494 (“[T]he policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority . . . .”); see 
also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 497 (1954) (reaffirming that “Separate but 
Equal” in D.C. is not even a little equal, but rather, subordinates blacks); Sweatt 
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950) (finding that “Separate but Equal” is not 
even a little equal but rather subordinates blacks in State education); McLaurin 
v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).  
 186 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 187 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he mentally retarded have been subject to a ‘lengthy and tragic history.’”) 
(quoting Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)). 
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subordination of the mentally disabled.188 Consequently, the Court 
has paid special attention to the existence of subordination or 
historical discrimination of a group when evaluating the suspect 
nature of a class.189 
There has been a history of subordination of special relevance 
from the government against undocumented aliens and their 
undocumented minor children. In California, for instance, 
Proposition 187 prohibited the use of non-emergency health care, 
public education, and other services by the undocumented.190 
Likewise, California Proposition 227 required public schools to 
eliminate Spanish instruction and teach Limited English 
Proficiency (LEP) students in special classes in English, although 
they are not familiar with the language.191 Similarly, the State of 
Arizona passed Proposition 200192 and introduced the Senate Bill 
(SB) 1070.193 Proposition 200 forced government employees to 
report if a person applying for public benefits lacked proper 
 
 188 Id. at 444-46 (holding that continuous legislation protecting the mentally 
disabled, and society’s approval of it, is evidence against the subordination and 
powerlessness of the class). 
 189 See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.  
 190 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1249, 
1255 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Michelle R. Alvarez and Tara L. Butterfield, The 
Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal 
Immigration, 81 SOCIAL SCI. Q. 167, 168 (2000). Proposition 187 was passed in 
1994 and was often referred to as the Save Our State initiative. The Proposition 
was struck down in part by the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California. The court found that California was “powerless to enact 
its own legislative scheme to regulate alien access to public benefits.” Wilson, 
997 F. Supp. at 1261. 
 191 Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 2002). Proposition 227, 
which passed in 1998, was known as an anti-bilingualism approach as its 
purpose was to eliminate all bilingual classes from the public-school system and 
required public-school instruction to be conducted in English. See id. 
 192 Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen Protection, Proposition 200, BALLOTPEDIA 
(2004), 
https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Taxpayer_and_Citizen_Protection,_Proposition_
200_(2004) [hereinafter Ballotpedia] (“Proposition 200 [passed in 2004] 
requires that a state or local governmental entity that is responsible for 
administering ‘state and local public benefits that are not federally mandated’ 
must verify the identity and eligibility for each applicant for the public 
benefits.”).  
 193 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012). SB 1070 passed in 
2010, id. 
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identification to U.S. immigration law enforcement, and made it a 
misdemeanor for public officials who failed to report these 
findings.194 While Arizona SB 1070 imposed a state misdemeanor 
on any alien who was not carrying his or her required 
documents,195 and also required officers to determine an 
individual’s immigration status during a “lawful stop, detention or 
arrest.”196 Likewise, the State of Alabama introduced House Bill 
(HB) 56, which permitted police officers to detain people based on 
the “suspicion” that they may be undocumented.197 Local 
governing bodies have also passed regulations and ordinances with 
the purpose of subordinating and eliminating this class. At the 
local level, the City of Manassas, Virginia passed Resolution 07-
894.198 Resolution 07-894 allowed local enforcement to check the 
immigration status of anyone they suspected was in the United 
States illegally without any probable cause.199 Additionally, the 
resolution called for the denial of social services and business 
licenses for this undocumented class.200  
Because of the strong historical and present trend of 
government subordination against undocumented entrants, and by 
default their children, this factor leans towards suspect class status. 
 
 194 Ballotpedia, supra note 192. 
 195 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 393-94.  
 196 Id. at 424.  
 197 Julia Preston, In Alabama, a Harsh Bill for Residents Here Illegally, NY 
TIMES, June 3, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04immig.html. 
HB 26, also known as Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, was 
introduced in 2011. Later that year, a repeal for parts of the law was 
recommended by the Attorney General of Alabama. Elise Foley, Alabama AG 
Luther Strange Recommends Repealing Parts Of State Immigration Law, 
HUFFPOST, (Dec. 6, 2011, 4:05 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/06/alabama-attorney-general-
recommends-repealing-parts-of-immigration-law_n_1132378.html. 
 198 9500 LIBERTY (St. Louis International Film Festival Nov. 15, 2009). 
 199 Id. The 2005 Resolution was particularly problematic because it gave to 
local enforcement immigration powers that fell under the Federal Government’s 
prerogative and allowed local enforcement to conduct stops without the need of 
probable cause.  
 200 Id.  
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D.  Democratic Defect or Political Powerlessness 
Political powerlessness or democratic defect is another main 
factor the Court uses in evaluating if a class should be extended 
suspect status.201 Democratic defect refers to the class’ lack of 
ability to count on the legislative process to protect its interest.202 
As seen in Footnote 4 of Carolene Products, political 
powerlessness is the idea that when something has gone wrong and 
it harms a group, there is a high probability that it is a result of 
something that has gone wrong in democratic process.203 In other 
words,  
While no group can expect to win every time in a 
democratic system, we all expect our lawmakers to 
consider our arguments with respect and to reject 
them only when they are inconsistent with the 
public interest. If a group fails to receive this 
treatment, it suffers a special wrong, one quite 
distinct from its substantive treatment on the 
merits.204 
Thus, democratic defect recognizes that democracy presumes 
that people vote for those who represent their interests.205 
Nevertheless, sometimes this does not always work so well: either 
 
 201 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 
(1973) (finding that “[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it 
defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not . . . 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”); Rush, supra 
note 50, at 713-14 (“Recall that ‘political powerlessness’ is a major criterion the 
Court uses to classify groups as suspect.”); Strauss, supra note 28, at 150-52 
(discussing political powerlessness as a factor). 
 202 Strauss, supra note 28, at 150-52 (discussing political powerlessness as a 
factor). 
 203 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[W]hether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities [exists depends on a serious] . . . 
curtail in the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities . . . which may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry.”). 
 204 Strauss, supra note 28, at 151 (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond 
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 738 (1985)). 
 205 Id. 
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for voters or for those unable to vote.206 Accordingly, if there is a 
democratic defect, Footnote 4 proposes that it is up to the courts to 
protect groups vulnerable to the biases of the legislature.”207 
Generally, democratic defect considers three factors: (1) 
underrepresentation, (2) reliance on stereotypes, and (3) political 
indifference.208 
1. Under Representation 
Democratic defect can be measured by observing if members 
of the group have achieved political positions of power,209 most 
often in legislative bodies. For example, the Court in Frontiero 
suggested that a women’s political powerlessness was a direct 
result of the absence of women in positions of political office.210 
Although women may not “constitute a small and powerless 
minority,” they are: 
Vastly underrepresented in this Nation’s decision-
making councils. There has never been a female 
President, nor a female member of this Court. Not a 
single woman presently sits in the United States 
Senate, and only 14 women hold seats in the House 
of Representatives . . . . [T]his underrepresentation 
 
 206 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; Rush, supra note 50, at 713-14; Strauss, supra 
note 28, at 150-52.  
 207 Strauss, supra note 28, at 153 (“[C]ourts must protect groups that are 
vulnerable to legislative bias”); see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
686 (1973) (concluding that women continue to face discrimination in the 
political arena warranting equal protection even with the strides of improvement 
they have accomplished). 
 208 Id. at 150-52; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; Rush, supra note 50, at 713-14; 
Caroline Mala Corbin, The Equal Protection Clause: Race-Based Classifications 
Subject to Strict Scrutiny, Constitutional Law Lecture (Fall 2018). This note 
narrows political democratic defect to these three main subfactors. Other 
proponents have alluded that courts consider (1) the ability to vote and (2) the 
pure numerical power of the group. Due to the inability of the undocumented 
and minors to vote, as well as the large population of the undocumented youth in 
the U.S, see discussion supra Part I (C)(3), these factors are not discussed. 
Additionally, both of these factors are often criticized and not frequently used.  
 209 Strauss, supra note 28, at 159. 
 210 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.  
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is present throughout all levels of our State and 
Federal Government.211 
Furthermore, underrepresentation can also be measured 
through an analysis of laws passed in favor of the class in 
question.212 If favorable laws exist, it is believed that the class has 
some sort of political power or influence in the legislature.213 The 
ruling in City of Cleburne reflects this interpretation. The Court 
explained that the legislature’s response for the mentally disabled 
“negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically 
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the 
attention of lawmakers.”214 
There is an underrepresentation of illegal children or former 
undocumented individuals in the legislature at a local, state, and 
federal level. The age of this group for obvious reasons prevents 
undocumented children for running for office. However, even if 
they reach the necessary age requirement for a political office, 
their legal status prevents them from running for office or voting 
for a representative that will consider their interests.215 For these 
reasons, there are very few lawmakers who originate from this 
group and have successfully been elected for political office.216 As 
of 2019, only two “Dreamers” or formerly undocumented 
individuals have been elected to Congress: Congressman Adriano 
Espaillat from New York and former Congressman Ruben Kihuen 
 
 211 Id. at 687-88, 686 n.17.  
 212 Strauss, supra note 28, at 156. 
 213 Id.  
 214 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445 
(1985). It is important to note that in City of Cleburne the existence of laws for 
the handicapped was a sign of political power. Yet in Frontiero, the opposite 
was true. The existence of laws against sex discrimination showed Congress 
itself found that classifications based on gender are inherently invidious. 
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687-88.  
 215 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall 
not . . . been nine Years a Citizen of the United States”); U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 
(“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of 
twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States”). 
216 Alex Thompson, How two formerly undocumented immigrants got elected to 
Congress, VICE NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/9kdzmp/how-two-formerly-undocumented-
immigrants-got-elected-to-congress.  
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from Nevada.217 Arguably, there might be strong lobby groups or 
coalitions that may represent the interests of the undocumented 
youth, but even today very few specifically address the needs of 
this group or successfully advocate for beneficial legislation.  
Notably, legislation, such as the Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, has been brought to 
the legislative floor but it has failed to obtain the sufficient support 
or votes to pass.218 The DREAM Act called for the cancelation of 
deportation for eligible aliens that were “younger than 18 years of 
age” when they entered the U.S.219 The DREAM Act proposed the 
granting of conditional residency status for the eligible 
undocumented youth.220 Additionally, the constitutional challenges 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) has faced also 
illustrates in part the political challenges children entrants 
confront.221 DACA was created through an executive order under 
President Barack Obama and currently faces constitutional 
challenges.222 Like the DREAM Act, DACA aims at stopping the 
deportation of the eligible undocumented youth.223 Although it 
 
 217 Id. Former Congressman Kihuen came to the U.S. from Mexico at the age 
of eight on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. He became a citizen through the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act signed by President Ronald Reagan. 
Congressman Espaillat, on the other hand, came to New York at age nine on a 
visitor’s visa and also overstayed. A year later, he became a permanent resident.  
218 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS), S.1615 – DREAM ACT OF 2017 
(2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1615.  
 219 Id.  
 220 Id. Eligible aliens is considered “an alien who is inadmissible or 
deportable or is in temporary protected status who: (1) has been continuously 
physically present in the United States for four years preceding this bill’s 
enactment; (2) was younger than 18 years of age on the initial date of U.S. entry; 
(3) is not inadmissible on criminal, security, terrorism, or other grounds; (4) has 
not participated in persecution; (5) has not been convicted of specified federal or 
state offenses; and (6) has fulfilled specified educational requirements.” 
 221 UNITED STATES CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS), 
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (last reviewed/updated 
Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-
childhood-arrivals-daca#guidelines (last visited Mar. 6, 2019).  
 222 Id. DACA was rescinded on Sept. 5, 2017. Because of the legal 
challenges it faces, USCIS stopped accepting any DACA applications from 
applicants that had never before been granted deferred action under DACA. 
 223 Id. Eligible aliens are considered those who: “(1) Were under the age of 
31 as of June 15, 2012; (2) Came to the United States before reaching . . . [their] 
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does not grant permanent residency status, it provides eligible 
immigrants with a social security card and a work authorization 
permit.224 Both of these proposals arguably have failed.  
Because the undocumented youth have little to no positions of 
political power nor influence over the legislature, this class is 
underrepresented, which is evidence of an overall democratic 
defect.  
2. Stereotypes and Prejudice 
Second, if laws or lawmakers rely on dangerous or offensive 
stereotypes, rather than facts, it is likely that there is a democratic 
defect. Legislators are not always immune from the public biases 
resulting from stereotypes against groups and may be susceptible 
to prejudice.225 Determining if lawmakers are relying on biases and 
stereotypes helps determine if closer judicial scrutiny is needed.226 
The Court in City of Cleburne explained:  
Heightened scrutiny does not allow courts to 
second-guess reasoned legislative or professional 
judgments tailored to the unique needs of a group    
. . . but it does seek to assure that the hostility or 
thoughtlessness with which there is reason to be 
concerned has not carried the day . . . [T]he Court 
recognizes . . . that a group may . . . be the target of 
the sort of prejudiced, thoughtless, or stereotyped 
 
16th birthday; (3) Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 
2007, up to the present time; (4) Were physically present in the United States on 
June 15, 2012, and at the time of making your request for consideration of 
deferred action with USCIS; (5) Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012; (6) Are 
currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from 
high school, have obtained a general education development (GED) certificate, 
or are an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of 
the United States; and (7) Have not been convicted of a felony, significant 
misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, and do not otherwise pose a 
threat to national security or public safety. 
 224 Id.  
 225 Strauss, supra note 28, at 151. 
 226 Id.  
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action that offends principles of equality found in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.227  
Thus, classifications must be carefully scrutinized to ensure 
that they are not based on unconstitutional and false stereotypes or 
assumptions.228 For example, in Korematsu, it is argued that the 
military order against the Japanese relied on the stereotype that all 
Japanese were inherently dangerous at this period in WWII.229 
Such a stereotype alerts the Court to a need for heighten scrutiny. 
Rather than facts, the government action would be relying on 
dangerous and impermissible stereotypes.   
With respect to minor children of undocumented entrants, most 
of the legislation discussed in Part II (C) relied on private biases 
and dangerous stereotypes about immigrants.230 Relying on 
dangerous or offensive stereotypes like this signal a democratic 
defect and offends the equal protection principles of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
3. Selective Indifference 
If there is an unconscious failure to extend to a minority or 
another the same care and recognition of humanity that one would 
give to their own, it is likely that there is a democratic defect.231 
This idea rests on the possibility that lawmakers have carved out a 
selective indifference for people who are not part of their own 
group.232 To understand selective indifference, it is important to 
reference Korematsu again.233 In Korematsu, people of Japanese 
descent were subject to a curfew in concentration-like camps under 
 
 227 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445 
(1985) (emphasis added). 
 228 Id. at 478 (“[C]lassifications . . .  must be carefully examined to assure 
they do not rest on impermissible assumptions or false stereotypes . . . . ”).  
 229 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 230 See discussion, supra Part II (C): Subordination or History of 
Discrimination; see generally Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387 (2011); League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F.Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997); 
Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002); Alvarez, supra note 190; 9500 
LIBERTY, supra note 198. 
 231 Corbin, supra note 208.  
 232 Id.  
 233 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
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the rationale of national security. 234 The drafters behind the order 
reasoned that isolating all people of Japanese descent was the best 
way to protect the United States against espionage.235 Although the 
United States was at war with both Japan and Germany,236 this 
order only targeted in application the Japanese, which signals the 
possibility of selective indifference. In other words, because 
Germans are more closely related and look like most of the drafters 
of the Korematsu Order, they are less likely to be impacted by the 
order. As such, because the drafters of the Order are less likely to 
be related to the Japanese and do not have a stake in the group, the 
drafters are more likely to be indifferent as to the effect of a 
Korematsu Order on a Japanese minority group.  
It is possible that lawmakers have carved out a selective 
indifference for children of undocumented entrants. That is, 
lawmakers have declined to extend a sign of humanity to this 
group which they do not belong to. While we cannot be certain, it 
is important to note that there are not many lawmakers that 
represent this group.237 It is also important to note that most 
lawmakers have voted down legislation that helps this particular 
group enter society as functioning members (i.e. The Dream Act) 
238 and that lawmakers have set forth law and regulations that 
negatively impact this class.239 The selective indifference present 
here signals a democratic defect, which as a whole makes this 
factor lean towards suspect or quasi-suspect class status.  
Consequently, because all four prongs of the four-part analysis 
that considers the factors that led to heightened scrutiny for race 
lean towards strict scrutiny for children of undocumented entrants, 
this class too should be extended “suspect” or at least “quasi-
suspect” class status. Accordingly, any law that makes 
 
 234 Id. at 218 (“We cannot say that . . . the Government did not have ground 
for believing . . . persons could not readily be isolated . . . and constituted a 
menace to the national defense and safety . . . . ”). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 See discussion supra Part II (D) (1): Democratic Defect or Political 
Powerlessness—Under Representation.  
 238 Id.  
 239 See discussion supra Part II (D) (1): Democratic Defect or Political 
Powerlessness—Under Representation.  
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discriminatory classifications against this class should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
 Minor children brought to the United States through no 
fault of their own should be considered a suspect class. 
Undocumented children should be granted protection from 
prejudice and democratic defect as insular minorities. While illegal 
alienage has not been found to be a suspect class,240 this subclass 
should be analyzed on its own merit. Although adult entrants 
voluntarily enter this class by virtue of entry into the country and 
fall short of suspect status,241 undocumented children do not. As 
such, the undocumented youth class is inherently different. In 
Plyler, the Court found it hard to justify that these children are 
responsible for their legal status and thus should face the 
consequences.242 Yet, the Court turned a blind eye on its findings 
and concluded that undocumented aliens and by default their 
children are not a suspect class.243 Analyzing the Courts rationale 
closely and their application of something more than rational basis 
leads to the conclusion that classifications of minor undocumented 
children should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 
Furthermore, after reviewing a four-part analysis that considers 
the same factors that led to heightened scrutiny for race, this note 
arrives at the conclusion that this subclass too is a “suspect” or at 
least a “quasi-suspect” class. The four-part analysis groups all 
factors the Court has used to extend or decline suspect class status 
to other groups together into: (1) the original intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the relevancy of the classification; (3) 
the subordination or historical discrimination of the class, and (4) 
evidence of a democratic defect or political powerlessness.244 This 
 
 240 See Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).  
 241 Id. at 219 n.19. 
 242 Id. at 220. 
 243 Id. at 202. 
 244 See generally Cornell LII, supra note 60; Strauss, supra note 28, at 148-
67; Sherry, supra note 28, at 108-14; see, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. 
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler, 457 U.S. 202; Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Graham v. 
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note finds that undocumented children meet most, if not all, of 
these factors. Because of their distinct nature from the general 
illegal alienage characteristics set forth by Plyler and the class’ 
satisfaction of the multiple “suspect” factors set forth by the Court, 
undocumented children should be extended suspect class status 




Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S. 184 
(1964); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
